December 10, 2024:
In September 2024 Ukraine officially established the Unmanned Systems Force or USF. Ukraine has built at least two million drones this year and has established manufacturing facilities in Ukraine and foreign nations to produce four million drones a year.
Ukraine has also established the UAV/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Force. This drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly but instead develops new drone models and organizes mass production for those new models that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in the Ukraine’s current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap, at a few hundred dollars each, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using FPV/First Person Viewing goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Some FPV drones have night vision and that nearly doubles the cost for each drone. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
A major limitation to the expansion of drone operations was the need for trained drone operators. These operators need over a hundred hours of training before they are able to start operating these drones, and another hundred hours of actual use before they are able to make the most out of the system.
These small drones are difficult to shoot down until they get close to the ground and the shooter is close enough, as in less than a few hundred meters, away to successfully target a drone with a bullet or two and bring it down. Troops are rarely in position to do this, so most of these drones are able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Earlier in the Ukraine War Russia used Iranian Shahed-136 drones that Iran sold for about $200,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of what the Shahed-136 cost. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or original Russians designes.
Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians or small teams designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.
One countermeasure that often works for a while is electronic jamming of the drones control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off from to land for later use. The jammers are on the ground and can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.
The emergence of drones as a new, novel, and decisive form of air power is the most recent of similar events that took place since the 1960s Vietnam War. During the last century the U.S. Air Force has advocated military victory achieved mainly with air power. This attitude took root after the 1914-19 World War I when the Army Air Corps got rid of most of its numerous reconnaissance aircraft and concentrated on bombers and fighters.
Then came the popular belief that larger bomber aircraft would dominate future wars. This never came to pass and, every time there was a war, the air force had to scramble to expand its meager peacetime reconnaissance force to meet the realities of war. This was not so bad during World War II because the air force was still part of the army but, after World War II, the Army Air Force became the independent U.S. Air Force and sought to control everything that flew over land. That meant army attempts to retain small reconnaissance aircraft and cargo aircraft were constantly opposed by the air force. The army valued prolific and prompt aerial reconnaissance more than the air force.
This led to a dispute that was not settled until 1960 when, after a decade of bickering, the Department of Defense ordered the army to stick with helicopters while the air force got nearly all the fixed-wing aircraft. The army was allowed to keep some single-engine artillery spotter aircraft and some twin-engine transports and intelligence collecting aircraft. That was it.
In the 1990s as electronic components became smaller, cheaper, more capable, and reliable, drones became practical and reliable aircraft for military use. The U.S. Army, and the CIA, quickly got a lot of them. drones have no aircrew in them, and the army does not consider them part of the half-century old compromise with the air force. At first, the air force paid little attention to the growing capabilities of drones. That was because the air force was run by pilots who took it for granted that nothing in the air was really useful unless it had a pilot flying it. The army and the CIA soon delivered an unexpected reality check to the air force. At that point, the CIA was already arming their large Predator drones with Hellfire missiles and the army eventually did the same.
With the army again flying armed aircraft in the form of armed drones, in addition to the armed helicopters it has always had, the air force began to notice. The army argument was that these larger drones work better for them if they are under the direct control of army combat brigades. The air force saw that as inefficient and preferred to have one large pool of larger drones which are deployed as needed. This difference of opinion reflects basic differences in how the army and air force deploy and use their combat forces.
The army has found that a critical factor in battlefield success is teamwork among members of a unit, and subordinate units in a brigade. While the air force accepts this as a critical performance issue for their aircraft squadrons, they deem it irrelevant for army use of drones. Seeing army MQ-1C Grey Eagle drones doing visual and electronic reconnaissance and firing missiles at ground targets, the air force sees itself losing control of missions it has dominated since its founding in 1948.
One thing the army acquisition of thousands of reconnaissance drones does not change is the air force loss of interest in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance after each war. Air force reluctance to develop, build and maintain a large strategic reconnaissance force led the CIA to use its considerable clout and budget developing strategic reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2 and SR-71 manned aircraft and surveillance satellites. The CIA also pioneered the use of larger drones like the 1.1-ton Predator and armed them. This helped the army win permission from the Department of Defense to expand its force of armed aircraft beyond helicopter gunships.
The army managed to keep its drones and that proved extremely important because, with the war on terror winding down, the air force is spending a lot less on aerial reconnaissance. The air force is buying fewer RQ-4 Global Hawk, and RQ-170 Sentinel strategic recon drones. The 17 elderly E-8 JSTARS battlefield surveillance aircraft, which proved so valuable after their first combat use in 1991, last flew in late 2023. JSTARS used an AESA ground radar that could track friendly and enemy forces from the air. While this was great for the army, it is not seen as a high priority item for the air force.
The army replaced the JSTARS capabilities with ABMS/Advanced Battle Management System software that networked larger numbers of drones and presented what the drones had observed or were observing to multiple users. It was another example of drone quantity and versatility replacing older, very expensive, individual systems like JSTARS. For the army this was a major plus because the 1950s agreement prohibited army operation of large aircraft like the four-engine JSTARS. This changed because during major conflicts the air force did not oppose the army use of many smaller, two-engine versions of these specialized electronic warfare or surveillance aircraft. The army has learned that lesson and is now retaining more of those two-engine aircraft and equipping some of their larger drones to do this work. Now the drones are replacing all aircraft except those that transport people and equipment.
In spite of negative air force attitudes, the air force did have some solid accomplishments to its credit. In some areas, it has been extremely successful. This includes gaining, since 1945 and maintaining ever since, air supremacy wherever it operates. Maintaining that capability is not easily accomplished or cheap and the air force gives air supremacy its highest priority, except in wartime when it has a lot more money and is redirected to accommodate army needs.
These air force attitudes have hurt the army in other ways. When it comes to influencing the war on the ground the air force is much less dominant. This is despite air force efforts to maintain its ability to bomb targets in direct support of ground operations. The air force blind spot when it comes to air reconnaissance has hurt its overall effectiveness. Blame this on a bad attitude towards BDA/Bomb Damage Assessment. This is the business of figuring out what to bomb, and what the impact on the enemy is after you bomb. The problem of the air force leaders being deceived by the people on the ground being bombed began during World War II. This was when air forces used large scale aerial bombing for the first time. Right after that conflict, the U.S. did a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It was discovered that the impact was far different from what air force BDA during the war had indicated. The air force vowed to do better next time. But as experience in Korea (1950-3), Vietnam (1965-72), Kuwait (1991) and Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), throughout the war on terror demonstrated, and now in Ukraine the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge when it came to deceiving the most energetic BDA efforts. The only proven technique for beating the BDA problem was to have people on the ground, up close, checking up on targets, while the fighting was going on. Those with powerful air forces do not want to do this because of the risk of some of their commandos getting killed or captured, and because the intel and air force people were sure that they knew what enemy was up to down there.
The people on the ground have consistently demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even during the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, the irregular forces they were facing proved capable of reducing the effectiveness of the drone effort. This spotlights another useful fact; airpower can be useful on the ground but that happens over time and not quickly. The problem here is with voters and the media. Both demand quick victory and in the U.S. that has developed into the three year rule in that public support for a way no matter how enthusiastic it was at first, is largely gone after three years. If an air campaign can’t get it done in three years that effort comes under media and political attack no matter how effective it has been.
But there's another problem. The army and air force have a different outlook on planning and risk. The air force sees warfare as a much tidier, and predictable, affair than what the army experiences regularly. In this respect, the air force and navy are closely aligned. Both are technical services, who are used to exercising more control over their forces than do army generals. The army sees warfare as more unpredictable and has adapted to that unpredictability. The army generals are usually skeptical of air force ability to take down foes from the air and the army pundits are usually right.
Despite being a successful high-tech operation, American air forces, especially the Navy and USAF, frequently have trouble adjusting to changes they do not agree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991 the air force was still largely thinking about continuing to operate as they had done in the Cold War, but the technology and tactics of warfare were changing. The post-Cold War enemy no longer consisted of large, organized forces spread over huge areas. The enemy was increasingly irregulars who were harder to spot from the air. The air force reluctantly adapted, in part because the army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques like drones and persistent surveillance. This pattern is returning as the air force reorganizes after the decade of heavy combat and big budgets the war on terror produced. Now the air force is turning its attention to a near-peer opponent in the form of a rapidly expanding and modernizing Chinese military.
Unexpectedly the Ukraine War emerged first with Russia and Ukraine fighting each other. Ukrainians had the advantage of material and intellectual support from NATO countries. In the end the winner of any stage of the war was the side that was the most resourceful and innovative. This process has been present in warfare for centuries but during the last century the changes and innovations came so quickly that the process was visible. This disrupted the long-established missions each of the military services had established.