A Study of the Dysfunctional Confederate Senior Command Relationships during the Atlanta Campaign

Based on his doctoral dissertation, Dennis Conklin’s first book looks deeply at the Confederate high command during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. He argues that CSA President Jefferson Davis’s personal shortcomings enabled the Union forces under William T. Sherman to defeat the Confederacy’s Army of Tennessee under first Joseph Johnston and later John Bell Hood. He stresses several points that disagree with main stream historians’ view of the battle over the past fifteen years.

Conklin emphasizes that:

1. “Davis failed to appreciate the benefits of a centralized command system”;

2. “Davis tended to allow his personal feelings to affect his decisions regarding strategy”; and

3. Davis “solicited correspondence that violated accepted military protocols, which led to Hood replacing Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee.

The book’s greatest strength lies in Conklin’s attention to the dysfunctional relationships within the Confederate high command, particularly between Davis and Johnston, ultimately leading to the loss of Atlanta. Conklin gives us a look at the leadership style of Davis, who supported a decentralizing department structure and allowed his personal friendships to influence his policy-making decisions. This was in contrast to Abraham Lincoln, whose willingness to change his views with regard to centralizing command under one general-in-chief, and willingness to relieve generals whom he personally liked if their performance did not meet expectations, such as John Pope and John McClernand. (p. xxiii) Conklin enables readers to understand lessons learned by each leader in performing his duties, which helped lead to an ultimately Union victory.

Conklin makes a convincing case for Joseph Johnston as a commander, noting his willingness to undertake strategic and tactical offensives as seemed reasonable, such as at First Manassas. Johnston’s requests for a concentration of forces in the spring of 1862 for a march on Washington, and for an offensive against Grant during the Vicksburg campaign were both turned down by President Davis, yet might have yielded major benefits. Conklin offers similar examples of the rejection of Johnston’s proposals during the Atlanta Campaign, like Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown’s offer to mobilize large numbers of militia and other second line troops, which might have affected operations at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain.

In addition, Conklin gives the reader a reinterpretation of the affair at Cassville in May 1864, when the lack of a Federal presence on the road to Canton on May 19th seemed to offer the possibility of a successful movement.

Conklin spends considerable time describing and explaining the various battles through to the fall of Atlanta, showing how Union successes significantly weakened the Confederacy, and helped Lincoln's reelection.

Well-written, tightly argued, and engaging, this insightful treatment is a valuable addition to the literature on the Army of Tennessee and the Atlanta Campaign.

Conflict and Controversy is a valuable read Civil War scholars, buffs, and even those who are new to the subject.

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Note: Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command is also available in e-editions.

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