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February 2025
February 26, 2025: On New Year’s day the UN authorized a new peacekeeping force of 11,900 troops. In February the U.S. carried out airstrikes against Islamic terrorists in Puntland, which is in northern Somalia. Soldiers and militiamen killed over 120 Al Shabab attackers.
Last year piracy returned to Somalia. This time the pirates had a difficult time of it because of all the foreign warships in the area dealing with Shia rebels in nearby Yemen who are attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea with drones and missiles provided by the rebels’ Iranian patrons. The Shia rebels use Iranian drones equipped with reconnaissance capability to locate targets off the coast and accurately fire missiles at ships passing through the narrow, 26 kilometers wide, Bab-el-Mandeb straits off southwestern Yemen. This forces ships, almost all of which are trying to use the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal, to take the longer and more expensive and time consuming route around the southern tip of Africa.
Some ships avoid or ignore the missiles and continue north to the Suez Canal. These ships discovered they faced another threat in that the Yemen rebels sent armed men in small boats to board these large cargo ships and force the crews to take them to towns on the nearby Somali coast known to be pirate friendly in the past. The warships off the Yemen coast have been more aggressive to deal with this, often launching a helicopter with armed men to land on the captured ship and deal with the pirates. Sometimes the pirates are warned and leave the hijacked ship before the helicopter arrives.
Worldwide, attacks on cargo ships, and an occasional tanker, are still a problem. In 2023 there were 120 attacks on ships compared to 115 in 2022. In 2023 105 ships were boarded, four ships were hijacked and two were fired on. When ships are boarded, there are attempts to kidnap crew members and hold them for ransom. In 2022 two crewmen were taken hostage while 14 were kidnapped. In 2023 there were 41 hostages and 73 kidnapped.
The hostages are used for taking control of the ship and moving it to a different location. Pirates rarely have any knowledge or experience operating these ships. Kidnapped crew are taken ashore and held until a ransom is paid. In December 2023 a large cargo ship was hijacked and taken to Somalia. This was the first hijacking since 2017.
Normally, none of the boardings and hijackings take place off the west coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea. There were also incidents or threats of attempts in the Singapore Straits, the Malacca Straits, and the Indonesian archipelago.
As recently as 2018 piracy was still a problem off the Somali coast, just not the kind that creates headlines in the international mass media. The pirates adapted and in 2017 there were nine pirate attacks off the Somali coast, up from two in 2016. This was notable because worldwide pirate activity hit a 22 year low with 188 attacks in 2017, and most of it was far away from Somalia in places like the west coast of Africa and Southeast Asia. Those 188 attacks created damage worth $7 billion, with 80 percent of it absorbed by the ships and their owners. Higher insurance rates and operating costs were the major additional costs. That is an issue off Somalia where higher insurance costs are still a problem and getting worse because of the ineffectiveness of defending warships this time.
Back in 2011 there were 327 attacks off the Somali coast. The solution was an international anti-piracy effort that continues. But shipping companies still have to pay higher insurance rates for their ships that operate in the danger zone extending far out into the Indian Ocean. At the end of 2017 the maritime insurance companies had real reason to be worried. In November 2017, for the first time since 2014, the international anti-piracy patrol arrested six Somali pirates who were caught firing on and trying to board ships off the Somali coast.
Violence in Somalia has targeted United Arab Emirates/UAE military training activities in the capital of Mogadishu. Several foreign military trainers were killed. Al Shabab continues to carry out terror attacks in and around Mogadishu. Al Shabab has been trying, without much success, to reverse progress over the last few years to bring peace and prosperity to Somalia. For example, in 2022 Somalia finally got a new government after several years of efforts to overcome clan and warlord objections to democracy in general. The elections were held, and results certified. This made possible the formation of a parliament and new president. The parliament met and approved the president’s selection of a new prime minister. The prime minister then formed a government by filling dozens of key jobs with candidates that did not cause disputes in parliament over who got what.
Somalia is still dominated by the power of the clans and the blind loyalty to clan even when it harms national unity. Overcoming this factionalism in a democracy is often very difficult. So far it appears that a majority of Somali leaders were willing to give a clean government a chance to work in Somalia. The key test is to form the new government successfully.
Major suppliers of foreign aid restored suspended aid programs. The United States ordered several hundred special operations and other troops to return to Somalia. In late 2020 the previous U.S. government ordered 700 U.S. troops out of Somalia. The departing American troops missed the most were Special Forces and SEAL operators training and advising their Somali counterparts. The American troops in Somalia also handled intelligence collection and monitoring things in general.
This continued from a major American special operations base in neighboring Djibouti as well as the use of American drones, also based in Djibouti, to search for Islamic terrorists and carry out airstrikes when the opportunity presents itself. After a year or so of indecision by the Americans, the U.S. resumed regular air strikes against Al Shabab and other groups interfering with aid shipments or the new Somali government. This led to over 200 drone airstrikes that killed nearly a thousand al Shabaab and other Islamic terrorist group members.
All this positive activity by the new government convinced foreign donors to continue and increase economic and military aid. Foreign money as well as peacekeepers were already being withdrawn before the new government was established. The UN had already started the process of pulling out its 20,000 peacekeepers. Foreign aid donors then adopted a policy of sending the aid to where it will do the best good. That policy put Somalia at a disadvantage because much, if not most, of its aid was stolen and never reached those who needed it.
If the new government can demonstrate an ability to change the wicked ways of its predecessors, the aid may resume and increase. Somalia and other nations in the region need this because the region is suffering from one of its periodic droughts, and a major one at that. In the past these major droughts would cause visible declines in the population. After World War II foreign aid by a growing number of countries and Non-government Organizations or NGOs made it possible to prevent these starvation deaths, at least in countries that could distribute the aid effectively. Somali was one of the nations that had trouble doing that, mainly because Somalia was still a deeply divided region because of the persistence of many powerful clans that looked after their own even if it meant other Somalis suffered. The clan loyalties are still a problem and a major factor in delaying fair election of a national parliament.
The new government also restored good relations with Kenya. This includes cooperation with Kenya in dealing with al Shabaab activity in northeast Kenya, where Mandera county has long suffered from Somali violence. This includes al Shabaab roadblocks to check vehicles for non-Moslems, who are often kidnapped or killed. Counter-terror efforts have largely kept al Shabaab terrorists out of the capital Nairobi, which is a thousand kilometers from Mandera, and that is what national politicians focus on. There have been two al Shabaab attacks in Nairobi since 2013. The latest one was in 2019. Politicians have priorities and problems get more attention the closer they are.
Al Shabaab has long sought to drive all non-Moslems out of northeastern Kenya because a lot of ethnic Somalis and Moslems live there. Over 80 percent of Kenyans are Christian and only twelve percent Moslem, most of them ethnic Somalis. There are also tribal problems in Mandera. One area along the Somali border has long been the scene of fighting between the Kenyan Murule ethnic Somali Moslems and the Marhan clan from across the border in Somalia. In 2015 about a hundred Marhan warriors crossed the border and raided Murule territory. Despite Kenya sending more soldiers and police to Mandera, the violence continued. The Marhan have long been accused of supporting al Shabaab while the Murule oppose Islamic terrorism and al Shabaab efforts to chase Christians from the Mandera region.
Somali refugees and ethnic Somali Kenyans living in Kenya near the Somali border have been a major source of al Shabaab recruits for raiding and terrorism in Somalia as well as Kenya. Somali violence, both from al Shabaab and clan disputes, is less frequent throughout Somalia but persists on both sides of the Kenya border. On the Somali side is the autonomous Somali region of Jubaland. Across the border are the Kenyan counties/provinces of Mandera, Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir and Marsabit. Occasionally the violence extends to cities elsewhere in Kenya. What is keeping al Shabaab active here and not elsewhere in Somalia are lucrative smuggling operations the Islamic terrorists dominate along the border.
In addition to bordering Somalia, there are several other reasons for all the Somali violence in this part of Kenya. First there is the usual pervasive corruption in Kenya and Africa in general. In addition, Somalia is recognized as the most corrupt nation in the world. Al Shabaab takes advantage of police corruption in Kenya, where the largely Christian police are particularly brutal towards ethnic Somali Kenyans. Similar attitudes are directed at the Somali refugees. That brutality and discrimination makes Kenyan Somalis reluctant to cooperate with police in finding al Shabaab terrorists or smugglers. About 76 percent of the four million Kenyan Moslems are ethnic Somalis who are citizens. Kenya’s Moslem minority has been known to harbor Islamic terrorists. Most Kenyan Moslems live in coastal cities like Mombasa, where about a third of the 1.1 million population is Moslem. A lot of ethnic Somalis and Moslems live in northeastern Kenya and that is a problem when most of the soldiers and police are Christians and non-Somali. Al Shabaab exploits this friction to continue recruiting in Kenya and enjoying some local support in the Kenyan border areas.