June 3, 2007:
How do Islamic terrorists pay for
things? By using many of the same techniques employed by organized crime. That,
however, has proved to be a major weakness, and is being exploited to hasten
the demise of the latest wave of Islamic terrorism. For organized crime,
terrorism is just another tool. For example, terrorism is regularly practiced
by organized criminal groups. That's how the famous ones, like the mafia, or
the Russian or Colombian gangs, make money and maintain discipline. What
separates "terrorist organizations" from criminal gangs is ideology and goals.
Organized crime groups just want to make money. Islamic terrorists, however,
have other goals. In this case, imposing Islam on the entire world. Making
money using criminal methods is a means to an end for them, not an end in
itself. Keep in mind that terrorist acts
are a constant, and most of these actions are carried out by criminals in
pursuit of a payday. Political or religious terrorists are using similar
terrorism to either attract attention, as a fund raising tool, or a weapon to
win concessions from governments.
Historically, it's quite common for terrorist
organization, be they motivated by political or religious goals, to gradually
turn into largely criminal gangs. That's where the mafia came from. Once a
resistance organization (against foreign rulers in Italy), it evolved into a
purely criminal outfit, and migrated to the United States, along with millions
of law-abiding Italians. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) is of more recent
vintage (late 19th century originally, but revived in the 1970s) that gradually
turned into a group of criminal gangs that mainly paid lip service to the IRAs
political goals (of a united Ireland).
Iraq and Afghanistan are two even more recent
examples. Iraq had dozens of major criminal gangs even in Saddam's police
state. Once Saddam was overthrown, these gangs largely sided with the Sunni
terrorists trying to put Saddam (or some other Sunni dictator) back in charge.
In Afghanistan, the pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes around Kandahar turned religion
into a cash cow, at least for a few tribes. Getting run out of power took away
their cash flow. After a few years in exile across the border, some of the Taliban
got funded (partly from one of their old sources, the drug gangs), and were
back in business.
What eventually kills all of these criminal
organizations is greed. Even the ones with an ideology have members who are
more motivated by the money, than the politics, religion or loyalty to their
fellow crooks. The use of cash rewards for information, or the capture of key
people, eventually brings in more and more useful data. As time goes on, more
and more of the terrorists can be turned into double agents. Civilians, caught
in the middle of all this, become more desperate, and less afraid, of the
terrorists. The useful tips increase, and those parts of the organization most
loyal to the ideology, are hurt the most. The more purely criminal branches
tend to survive, which is how the surviving mafia organizations can trace their
lineage back to 19th century freedom fighters. But in the last two decades, the
mafia and IRA have been reduced to much smaller, and less effective,
organizations.
In some parts of the world, many people are
normally employed in what would be considered, in the West, as criminal
enterprises. In Afghanistan, many of the tribes out in the countryside,
consider anyone not from their tribe as fair game for robbery, extortion or
kidnapping. Thus the Taliban will be around for a long time, although in
diminished capacity. Many of the current Taliban leaders are discovering, as
did leftist rebels in Colombia, that life's a lot easier if you just ditch the
ideology, and concentrate on the drug business.
The police approach to terrorism has worked
numerous times in the past few decades. India crushed powerful Sikh separatists
in the late 80s and early 90s by concentrating on what were basically police
methods of developing informers and double agents and going after the key
people and the criminal fund raising activities. At the same time, Egypt was
crushing Islamic radicals, using similar techniques. Throughout the 1990s,
Algeria fought a vicious Islamic terrorist group, finally reducing their numbers
from over 10,000, to less than 500. Same thing with Israels success against
Palestinian terrorists who were successful, for a few years after 2000, with
suicide bomber attacks inside Israel. The U.S. adopted a lot of the Israeli
techniques for intelligence collection and agent development.
The United States has had one major disadvantage; a
severe shortage of people who speak the local language. Developing agents in
Afghanistan and Iraq thus takes a lot longer, and it's necessary to depend on
the local governments, which are incredibly corrupt by U.S. standards. But
after a few years, the American advantages in cash, and combat power, become
much more potent because of the growing amount of good intel. This can be seen
happening over the last two years in Iraq, and in the last year as the Taliban
tried to make a comeback.
In the end, if you are successful, you will have a
lot fewer ideological terrorists (interested in blowing things up in the United
States) and a remnant of criminal gangs interested in Americans as robbery
victims, not dead bodies.