May 15, 2026: Russia is now deploying and testing several unusual small satellites in LEO/Low Earth Orbit. With this Russia is deploying operational anti-satellite weapons with valuable American government satellites in as targets.

An American general would not identify the system, but he was almost surely referring to a Russian military program named Nivelir, which has launched four satellites shadowing American spy satellites owned by the NRO/National Reconnaissance Office in LEO. After reaching orbit, the Nivelir satellites have released smaller objects to start their own movements, and at least one of those hurled a mystery object at high velocity during a test in 2020. American analysts concluded this was a projectile that could be fired at another satellite.

American officials have compared the Nivelir architecture to an object with increasingly smaller objects inside it or a Russian nesting doll, with an outer shell concealing smaller, unknown figures inside.

The newest suspected Nivelir satellite was launched last May from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia. Its launch was precisely timed for the moment Earth’s rotation spun Plesetsk underneath the orbital plane of the NRO’s American 338 Keyhole-class optical spy satellite. Civilian missions heading to the International Space Station launch with similarly precise timing, down to the second, to intersect with the space station’s orbital plane.

Ars has covered Russia’s testing of the Nivelir stalker satellites before. The first Nivelir test mission launched in 2013, and they began creeping near American spy satellites in 2019. American officials now believe the Nivelir system is operational.

It’s evident that Russia was deploying a space weapon there, and they’re putting it into an orbit where they can reach critical American national security satellites. If you return to some of those early launches of that system, the Russian nesting doll system, they were testing that. This was seen as a Russian affront.

It would appear as if we had a new fighter, maybe the new F-47 that the Air Force is going to obtain, with a new missile system, and we decided, instead of testing that on our test ranges back in Nevada or Utah, we decided to send that airplane up to Alaska, and as Russian bombers were flying patrols somewhat near our coastline, we sent this brand new F-47 up to test near a Russian bomber. It’s just not the sort of thing we customarily observe.

So far, none of the Nivelir satellites have gotten closer than a few dozen miles from their NRO counterparts. But they launched into orbits that would allow Russian commanders to approach American spy satellites with little alarm. That is no coincidence, according to American officials. Launching these missions just a few minutes earlier or later would put them into a different orbital plane, making it much more difficult, perhaps impossible, depending on fuel carried, to get close to or strike one of the American spy satellites. The situation suggests intentionality.

So the Russians were testing weapons near our satellites, and now we consider they’re through testing, and now they’re putting operational systems up within orbit reach of our high-value satellites. It’s evident what they’re doing, and we maintain constant watchfulness while observing that.

This constant vigilance requires close observation through a network of ground- and space-based surveillance sensors. Telescopes and radars routinely track tens of thousands of objects in orbit. Russia’s Nivelir satellites are near the top of the priority list.

If one of these Russian weapons systems starts to maneuver, we want to be able to detect that very quickly and be able to provide that warning to the operators of that critical national security satellite.

For years, American military officials have identified China as the primary threat in space. In other words, China has the most advanced space technology of any prospective American adversary. But it takes more than a technology evaluation to size up a geopolitical rival. One must also consider their strategic priorities, tactical advantages and disadvantages, and to some degree, the psychology of their leaders.

Russia remains a capable space power, even while its space industry suffers from systemic underfunding, quality control issues, international sanctions, and export controls, American intelligence agencies wrote in their annual unclassified threat assessment released earlier this year.

Russia’s space industry has far less money than the American and Chinese space programs. Russian factories produce fewer satellites, and Russian rockets launch less often than the world’s other two leading space powers. But Russia seems to have a unique theory for the use of anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons.

Russia has come to the conclusion that they have a conventional arms deficit compared to the United States and its NATO allies. Russian forces are seeking to get an asymmetric advantage anywhere they can.

They’re looking for novel ways to try to balance that correlation of forces, to use a Soviet term. So they’re looking at nuclear, cyber, and space, and that’s why, when we read the reports over the last two years that Russia may be considering placing a nuclear ASAT on orbit, we find those just incredibly disturbing.

American forces rely on space-based assets for all major military operations. Satellite capabilities, such as overhead surveillance, navigation, missile warning, and electronic warfare, are now fully nested in all military planning. If you take away any of these capabilities, American forces cannot fight the way they are designed or sized.

It has been observed that the Chinese and the Russians have studied us since the 1991 Desert Storm operation. They have tried to understand how it is that the United States is able to create such global effects with what appears to be such a small number of forces, and they’ve assessed that space is one of those foundational issues. So now they have developed a suite of counter-space weapons.

The United States, China, Russia, and India have each demonstrated the ability to destroy a LEO satellite using a ground-launched missile. Russia’s development of co-orbital ASAT, or counter-space, weapons has long focused on LEO. That may be changing with the launch of a suspected Nivelir or similar mission last year toward a geosynchronous orbit more than 32,000 kilometers above Earth.

So far, China’s military space strategy appears to be copying the American military’s winning formula in orbit. Like the American Space Force, China has a growing fleet of reconnaissance and inspection satellites in geosynchronous orbit, some of which may also have the capability to strike. China has deployed its own GPS satellite network and a constellation of intelligence-gathering satellites to monitor locations around the world and, if necessary, supply targeting information for a military attack. The Chinese, they have studied us extremely well for 35 years, and really, they’re trying to replicate what we have done.

An indiscriminate ASAT strike using a nuclear detonation or a high-velocity projectile would make LEO more hazardous for all satellite operators. A nuclear weapon would pollute LEO with radiation, and a dynamic strike would generate thousands of new pieces of space junk. The Americans have the most to lose in such a scenario, followed by China.

Russia, on the other hand, is in a hot war with Ukraine. The conflict has introduced new tactics in warfare, such as cyberattacks on space networks, one-way and first-person-view drones, and GPS jamming. The war also revealed deficiencies in Russia’s conventional ground and air forces. The experience could drive Russian leaders to look to the space or cyber domains to find an edge.

Ukraine’s use of Starlink for resilient communications and American plans to deploy hundreds of missile defense satellites probably are amplifying adversary views of the importance of defeating large constellations, American intelligence officials said in this year’s threat assessment. A Russian nuclear ASAT would be the easiest way to take out such a proliferated network.

Russia could have directly attacked in space, indicating the start of the Ukraine war. They’ve exhibited that capability. In fact, they did a hit-to-kill ASAT test months before they invaded Ukraine to send a signal to us and the rest of the West. But they would rather attack us in cyber because it’s easier for them, cheaper for them, and harder for us to attribute.