January12, 2007:
Since September 11, 2001, some $20 billion has been spent on civilian
firms providing logistical support to American military operations in the
United States and ten foreign countries. While this money went to over 34,000 contractors,
most of it was controlled by a few larger firms, like Halliburton (and its
subsidiary, Brown and Root). That caused some stink in the media, because all
that money being managed by one firm provided enough scary stories of things
gone wrong, to attract lots of journalists. The reality is rather different.
But no one has come up with a better way to get this work done. Using military
resources won't work, because those resources don't exist.
The
military, of all nations, have been using civilian contractors for logistics
and combat support, since ancient times. The reason is simple, the civilian
economy usually has more resources than the military, and can mobilize these
resources more quickly. There were some exceptions to this in the 20th century.
During World War II, the fighting in the Pacific was often in such remote
areas, and the American economy was to totally mobilized for a major war, that
is was easier for the military to bring in its own construction, logistics and
maintenance people. Even then, most of the shipping was run by civilian crews,
and, where available (as in Australia), civilian firms were hired to build and
maintain bases, and provide other support services. Then, at the end of World
War II, billions of dollars in assets were basically dumped in the ocean or
abandoned on Pacific islands. Most of the half million or so sailors and
soldiers who manned this operation disappeared in a few months, as they
returned to civilian life. It just wasn't worth it to try and salvage much of
the infrastructure built on those Pacific islands, or even ship it back
home.
When
the Korean war came along, most of the logistical support was provided for by
Japanese, South Korean and American contractors. In Vietnam, civilians again
took the lead in building and maintaining the logistical support system. In the
aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. Army took a close look at its logistical
arrangements and decided to organize the process of mobilizing civilian firms
for wartime support operations. The army could also see domestic disaster
relief situations, where the army is called in, as also in need of some
systematic planning. So in 1985, the LOGCAP (Logistics Civilian Augmentation
Program) was formed. LOGCAP was used in the 1990 Gulf War, Balkans peacekeeping,
several other operations in the 1990s, and throughout the war on terror.
The
biggest problem LOGCAP runs into is when combat commanders demand that certain
things be done quickly, regardless of cost, and those things are done. Auditors
and reporters come in the wake of this sort of thing, finding plenty of excess
costs and fraud. But therein lies the problem. If you want it done with minimal
waste and fraud, it's going to take a lot longer. If you want it done right
away, it's going to cost you. It is possible to reduce the waste and fraud, but
that means training military personnel who can oversee the LOGCAP contracts,
catch the waste and fraud, but not get in the way of accomplishing the work on
time. The military has not been able to attract a sufficient number of people
to this "oversight" job. The military doesn't pay enough, and these people
would spend most of their time doing nothing (except getting ready for the next
emergency, and trying to look busy.) Currently, it's considered more practical
to just take the hits from headline hungry Congressmen and journalists, and get
on with the job.