July 16, 2007:
The U.S. Air Force is having a hard
time deciding what to do with UAVs. Since combat pilots run the air force,
there has always been a lot of resistance, at the very top, to buy and use
UAVs. It was circumstances, more than anything else, that forced the air force
to accept UAVs. The CIA got their hands on some Predator UAVs, used them
successfully after September 11, 2001, armed them and used the Hellfire
missiles to kill terrorists. This forced the air force to be more enthusiastic
about UAVs. After much pressure from critics, the air force had finally gotten
the Predator (which was based on one of many successful Israeli UAVs) in the
early 1990s, and used it in the Balkans. But it was the more creative CIA use
of the Predator that stirred things up. The army then adopted the Raven
mini-UAV. This five pound UAV, launched by throwing it into the air, quickly
became a big favorite with combat units. Over a thousand were bought. Larger
UAVs (the Hunter and Shadow 200) were bought for brigade and division level
operations. All of a sudden, the air force was not as needed, by the ground
forces, as much as it used to be.
The air force responded to all this by demanding
that the Department of Defense put it in charge of developing all new UAVs,
except possibly smaller ones like the Raven. The infantry community made it
known that they would not, under any circumstances, let the air force mess with
their little UAVs. It was a matter of life and death for the grunts, and the
air force backed off. The Department of Defense also got heat from the army,
marines and navy about the proposal to let the air force have the final word on
developing new UAVs. At the moment, everyone is being told to play nice, with
no one in overall charge of UAV development.
Meanwhile, within the air force itself, there was
growing split over how to deal with UAVs. Call it a struggle between the geeks and
the pilots. The geek faction wants to move ahead at full speed, and put more
effort into UAVs. The pilots were more reluctant. The result is a slow and
muddled effort to get UAVs into action. For example, there were many
operational problems with the Predator, which led to a high attrition rate
(about a third of Predators lost, mostly to operational problems, in the first
decade of use.) An example of that was the wing icing problems in the Balkans,
that brought down many Predators. The air force was aware of wing icing over 70
years ago, and had ways to deal with it. Yet they sent Predators into action
without adequate deicing capabilities. There were many other oversights like
that, indicative of an air force that wasn't really eager to see UAVs succeed.
This could also be seen in who the air force selected to operate the Predator.
They used existing pilots of fighters and transports, and made it a temporary
assignment. Other services had much more success making it a career opportunity
for NCOs. The air force slowly came around to the career angle, and better
training for the operators, but the damage was already done.
Reliability issues hurt the Predator where it was
most vulnerable, in its ability to stay in the air for a long time. Although
the Predator was, in theory, able to stay in the air for over 30 hours,
reliability issues generally limited air time to about half that. This also
made inflight refueling moot. The geeks wanted to move forward on improving
reliability, and introducing inflight refueling, especially for the larger
Predator B (or "Reaper"). But the pilot faction was not eager to see the Reaper
succeed, because this UAV was built to replace fighter bombers. Normally, a
Reaper carried two 500 pound JDAMS and
two Hellfire missiles. If reliable enough, and with inflight refueling, a
Reaper could stay up for several days. But with all the delays in dealing with
reliability issues, it will be years before inflight refueling is worth the
effort.
And then there's weapons support. The Reaper needs
a special rack to carry the new 250 pound SDB (Small Diameter Bomb). Right now
this will be available in about four years. The air force throws up a lot of
smoke in defense of this delay, but the geeks know the real reason why.
The reliability issue works for the pilots faction,
because the higher loss rate of UAVs makes them look less effective, on paper,
compared to manned fighter-bombers. Thus pushing the purchase of new, and three
times as expensive (with better sensors and all that) Reapers, will make manned
aircraft look good, if enough of those Reapers have accidents.
Currently, army and marine UAVs operate for many
more hours over the battlefield than do air force Predators and Reapers. On
average, about a dozen Predator sorties a day are flown in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The army flies many more than that with its Hunters, Shadows and
Ravens. But noting that only Predator can carry large missiles like Hellfire,
the air force is doubling the number of armed Predator sorties, and hustling to
get the Reaper into action. The number of UAV crews is being increased from 120
to 160. But the army doesn't want more aircraft with weapons up there, it just
wants more eyes in the sky. It's information about what the enemy is doing that
saves lives on the ground, not armed UAVs.
In the long run, the geeks will win. Other nations,
with less money and less influential air force generals who were once pilots,
will build more effective and reliable UAVs. At that point, the U.S. will have
to listen to the air force geeks, and get more serious about UAVs.