July 1, 2007:
The U.S. Army is
concerned that some of their senior commanders (division and above) are not as
well trained and prepared for the current war,
as they could be. It's believed that the lower ranking commanders are
getting realistic and effective training for what they must do in combat, but
the more senior guys are not, and this has led to a lot of bad decisions. This
is an old problem, and for most of American history, it was customary for many
generals to be fired during the first few months of a war. That's because many
generals who seemed like effective military leaders in peacetime, turned out to
be much less capable under fire. It wasn't just generals who were fired (or at
least transferred to non-combat jobs), but lots of lower ranking officers, and
some senior NCOs, as well.
That hasn't happened as much
during the current war. Part of the reason is better training. Since the 1980s,
American army officers and NCOs have benefited from new, and very realistic
combat training methods. This was made possible by some new technology. Instead
of using real ammunition (which only commando type troops can get away with using
in training), the army substituted lasers (the MILES system). The culmination
of this new training was held at the National Training Center (NTC), whhere a
huge area was rigged to electronically record everything that happened. Vietnam
era officers and NCOs who went through NTC remarked that it was very close to
actual combat. But was it close enough to impart useful experience, and
identify those leaders who would fold under the pressures of combat? Apparently
it did. The 1991 Gulf War showed that all the army troops that went through the
new training performed as well as combat experienced veterans had in earlier
wars. This was a rather surprising development. For thousands of years, despite
strenuous training, it was believed that only exposure to actual combat
created effective troops. Now there was
a way to do it without "blooding" (and losing quite a few of) the troops in
combat.
During the 1991 Gulf War, an American army composed largely of men who
had never been in combat, easily crushed a force largely composed of combat
veterans from the 1980s Iran-Iraq war (which had ended four years earlier.) The
new training technology was eventually applied to combat support troops, police
and paramilitary personnel. But there was no "NTC quality" training for
generals. It's not that no one ever thought of this. In the 1990s, the
Department of Defense began training programs for men and women recently
promoted to general ("flag officer") rank. This was considered a bold
innovation. Being a general or an admiral is a big deal, and for centuries, it
was believed that, whoever was selected for flag rank, had the ability to
quickly learn whatever they needed to do their job. But at the same time, there
were all those peacetime generals failing during their first wartime
assignments. Something was still wrong, and the better trained junior officers
were beginning to notice it.
There are wargames and
simulations for generals to use, but none of them present the same degree of
realism, pressure and challenge as NTC provided brigade commanders, and
everyone else in the brigade. It was discovered during NTC training that some
brigade commanders were not up to the task. Brigade commanders are colonels.
The next step up is to general. Interestingly, it was official policy that
performance at NTC could not be used to decide who to promote. Unofficially, if
you screwed up at NTC, word got around and your promotion prospects went south.
In contrast, if you kicked butt at NTC, you usually found yourself on the fast
track. Usually, but not always. So most current army generals (at least those
in the combat branches like infantry, armor and artillery) have been tested at
NTC. But those who do well at NTC, are not always the ones who get promoted to
general.
To be a successful general in
peacetime you have to good political skills. The more senior a general becomes,
the more often they have to deal with politicians and other senior government
officials. While a pleasant personality is not essential for a good battlefield
general, it helps a whole lot if there's no war going on. In fact, it's quite
common for outstanding wartime generals to have a tarnished reputation as a
peacetime general.
What's happened during the
current war is that the generals are not as bad as in past wars, providing
fewer obvious situations that call for the guy to be tossed. In other words,
there are a lot of mediocre generals who sort of just get by, rather than
spectacular duds. The troops talk about
it, but there haven't been any flubs spectacular enough for the media to pick
up and run with. The generals in question are no dummies. They are cautious to
a fault, and that's their biggest flaw. Junior commanders complain of bosses
who won't take chances, even if there could be a spectacular payoff. On the
plus side, this phenomenon is at least being talked about more and more. There
might even be a solution some day.