November10, 2006:
Another group of Chinese spies have been indicted in the United
States. This time it's five members of the same family. Some were caught trying
to leave the United States, for China, carrying incriminating documents. China
was apparently seeking technical details on new U.S. Navy warships, and
military electronic equipment in general. Chi Mak and Tai Mak, both American
citizens, are facing the most serious charges.
The
China is using an espionage system called, "a thousand grains of sand." It is
nothing new. Other nations have used similar systems for centuries. What is
unusual is the scale of the Chinese effort. The Chinese intelligence
bureaucracy inside China is huge, with nearly 100,000 people working just to
keep track of the many Chinese overseas, and what they could, or should, to
trying to grab for the motherland.
Chinese
intelligence officials try to have a talk with Chinese students and business people
before they leave the country to study or do business, and after they come back
as well. The people going to the West are asked to bring back anything that
might "help the motherland." Most of these people were not asked to actually
act as spies, but simply to share, with Chinese government officials (who are
not always identified as intelligence personnel) whatever information they
obtained.
Of
course, it soon became open knowledge in China, and in Western intelligence
agencies, what was going on. Quiet diplomatic efforts, over the years, to get
the Chinese to back off were politely ignored. Another problem is that China
has never been energetic at enforcing intellectual property laws. If a Chinese
student came back with valuable technical information (obtained in a classroom,
in a job, or simply while socializing), the data was often passed on to Chinese
companies, or military organizations, that could use it. Since there were few
individual Chinese bringing back a lot of data, or material (CDs full of
technical data, or actual components or devices), it was difficult for the
foreign counterintelligence agencies to catch Chinese "spies". There were
thousands of them, and most were simply going back to China with secrets in
their heads. How do you stop that?
Some
of the more ambitious of these spies, like the Mak family, have been caught red
handed with actual objects. But most of the swarm moved back to China
unhindered. Naturally, the Chinese push their system as far as they can. Why
not? There was little risk. The Chinese offered large cash rewards for Chinese
who could get particularly valuable stuff back to China. Chinese intelligence
looked on these "purchases" as strictly commercial transactions. If
the Chinese "spies" got caught, they were on their own. The Chinese involved
knew the rules. If they were successful, they won favor with the government, or
even made a pile of money, and the Chinese government was agreeable to whatever
business deals these "patriotic" Chinese tried to put together back
in China. This kind of clout is important in China, where a "friend in the
government" is more valuable than in the West. But more and more of these
ambitious Chinese agents are getting caught because it is becoming known, to
the Western business and academic community, what is going on. There are over
ten million Americans and Europeans of Chinese ancestry. Many are recent
immigrants, or simply students or people working in Canada temporarily for
Chinese companies. They all have family back in China, and are thus vulnerable
to getting recruited, usually unwillingly, as one of the "thousand grains of
sand."