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August 23, 2025: Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) has been a critical yet challenging aspect of military operations since World War I (1914–1918). Despite advances in technology and tactics, accurately determining the effectiveness of airstrikes has remained elusive, impacting coordination between air and ground forces and shaping military strategy.
Since World War I, BDA has sought to accurately determine the effectiveness of airstrikes, but early efforts were often unsuccessful. During World War II (1939–1945), air and ground forces grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of timely and accurate BDA, particularly regarding the impact of airstrikes. This led to persistent challenges for air forces and the ground troops they supported.
The U.S. Air Force has long advocated for military victory through air power, a stance rooted in its well-earned reputation for technological prowess. Since 1945, it has consistently achieved and maintained air supremacy in its operational theaters. However, its influence on ground warfare has been less dominant, largely due to BDA limitations. During World War II, large-scale aerial bombing, especially against economic targets in Germany (1943–1945), highlighted the issue. Post-war surveys revealed that strategic bombing’s impact differed significantly from wartime BDA reports, prompting the Air Force to pledge improvements.
Subsequent conflicts—Korea (1950–1953), Vietnam (1965–1972), Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), and Ukraine (since 2022)—demonstrated that adversaries consistently deceived even the most rigorous BDA efforts. The only reliable solution was deploying personnel on the ground to verify targets during combat, a practice resisted by air forces due to the risks of casualties or capture and overconfidence in aerial reconnaissance, such as scrutinizing aerial photos. By the 21st century, the wide availability of commercial satellite photos enabled media and individuals to conduct independent BDA.
Ground forces have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even in the early 21st century, when the U.S. introduced persistent drone surveillance, irregular forces adapted to reduce its effectiveness. This underscores a key limitation: air power’s impact on ground operations often manifests gradually, not immediately. Public and media expectations, particularly in the U.S., exacerbate this issue, as support for military campaigns typically wanes after three years—the so-called “Three Year Rule”—regardless of air campaign effectiveness.
The Air Force and Army differ in their approach to planning and risk. The Air Force, aligned with the Navy, perceives warfare as a precise, predictable endeavor, leveraging technical control over its forces. Conversely, the Army views warfare as inherently unpredictable and adapts accordingly. Army generals often express skepticism about the Air Force’s ability to decisively defeat ground forces through airstrikes, a perspective frequently validated by historical outcomes.
Despite their technological sophistication, the U.S. Air Force and Navy have struggled to adapt to post-Cold War changes. The shift from large, organized enemy forces to elusive irregular forces complicated aerial targeting. The Air Force reluctantly adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance methods, such as drones, following the lead of the Army and CIA. Precision munitions also transformed air campaigns, rising from 8% of U.S. fires in the Gulf War (1991) to 68% in Iraq (2003), and becoming standard for industrialized nations thereafter.
The CIA pioneered Persistent Surveillance with armed drones, enabling 24/7 monitoring and precise missile strikes on identified targets. This reduced collateral civilian casualties to historically low levels and proved effective against terrorist leaders. However, Air Force traditionalists argued that such tactics were impractical in conventional wars with advanced air defenses, where drones like Predators and Reapers could be easily shot down. Critics countered that militaries must address current threats, not just preferred scenarios. Even in conventional wars, these tactics and technologies remain relevant.
The Air Force’s focus on stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2/B-21 bombers persisted, despite adversaries developing sensors to counter stealth technology. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s war against Russian forces since 2022 showcased a drone revolution. Ukrainians replaced much of their artillery, manned aircraft, and anti-tank weapons with diverse drone designs. Thousands of small, inexpensive surveillance drones overwhelmed air defenses, enabling precise attacks by coordinating with attack drones, resulting in significant enemy casualties.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy faced similar adaptability issues during the Vietnam War (1960s), where Russian-trained North Vietnamese pilots, using Russian aircraft and tactics, outperformed U.S. aviators. This led to the reintroduction of autocannons on aircraft, as air-to-air missiles proved unreliable. The Navy responded with the Top Gun program in 1969, emphasizing dissimilar training to simulate enemy tactics and aircraft. The Air Force followed with its Red Flag school. By the 1980s, Russia, China, and other air forces adopted similar programs, and smaller nations sent pilots to commercial Top Gun/Red Flag equivalents staffed by veteran instructors.
Since World War I, air power’s primary value lay in reconnaissance, a role that persisted through World War II. Strategic bombing, despite its prominence, was less effective than tactical bombing and strafing, which supported ground troops and provided immediate feedback on strike effectiveness. The Air Force, however, prioritized strategic bombing, which often produced indiscriminate damage without decisive outcomes.
In the 21st century, BDA improved significantly through ground-based intelligence, including cellphone photos from agents or civilians in enemy territory. In Ukraine, civilians used air defense apps to record and photograph incoming attacks, enhancing air defense effectiveness. However, this reliance on cellphones introduced risks, as their signals could reveal user locations, enabling enemy counterattacks. Despite rules prohibiting cellphone use in combat zones, enforcement remained challenging, as soldiers and civilians valued connectivity despite the dangers. Electronic jamming provided only partial mitigation.
BDA remains a persistent challenge for air forces, rooted in the difficulty of accurately assessing airstrike impacts from the air. Historical and modern conflicts highlight the necessity of ground-based verification, despite resistance from air forces favoring technological solutions. The evolution of drone warfare and civilian technologies like cellphones has revolutionized BDA, but new vulnerabilities, such as enemy exploitation of cellphone signals, underscore the complexity of modern warfare.