On the Confusion in Clausewitz

Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege (On War, published in 1832) remains an enigma for the social scientists, military theoreticians, and the officers of the armed forces. Neither scholars, nor laymen could make any clear sense of the book or Clausewitz’s arguments. After reading through the dense thick volume, the readers do not get a clear sense of whether Clausewitz was speaking of absolute war (total war) or limited war or advocating defence or offence. Confusion among the readers has created awe and respect for the author and his product. Both scholars and general public conclude that Clausewitz’s On War is not an easy read because of the author’s philosophical sophistication. Noted historian Azar Gat in the volume under review asserts that the confusion in Clausewitz’s magnum opus was actually the result of indecision in the Prussian officer’s mind.

In The Clausewitz Myth, Gat attempts to uncover the evolution of Clausewitz’s thinking pattern by analysing the various writings and notes which Clausewitz had penned till the time of his death in 1831 and the broader intellectual climate within which he operated. Drawing from his earlier seminal work The Origins of Military Thought (1989), Gat asserts that Clausewitz was the product of Romantic intellectual climate which swept over Germany in reaction to the French Enlightenment philosophy introduced by the French Revolution and then by the Napoleonic armies. Gat in his earlier book (but not in the book under review) uses the German term Aufklarers for the Romantic School. This body of thought challenged the Enlightenment philosophy’s core argument that everything in the world and human activities can be tabulated. Rather than focusing on the quantifiable material aspects, like the advocates of Enlightenment, the Romantic School (Counter-Enlightenment) stressed on the human spirit. This Romantic trend is evident in On War which focuses on great generals (role of military genius) among other things. For Clausewitz, the ‘genius for war’ emerges as an ubermensch. Being deeply influenced by Napoleonic Warfare, Clausewitz has in his mind the image of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Till 1826, claims Gat, Clausewitz believed that Napoleon’s all out war represented the true nature of war. Fight to the finish, with all the energies and assets of a nation, represents the essential character of war. However, in the post Napoleonic period with its limited wars, Clausewitz started to have his doubts. Gat writes that in a note dated 1827, Clausewitz started revising his work but he died before completing his revision. In his partly revised version, which was published posthumously by his wife, Clausewitz brings in the role of politics which limits the tendency of fighting bloody decisive battles to the last man and the last bullet. Even this is not a new point. Gat rightly says that long before Clausewitz, the Greek historian Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War (composed during the fifth century BCE) has pointed out the decisive role of politics in shaping the origin, course, and consequences of war.

Gat correctly notes that unlike the Late Roman military theorist Vegetius, Clausewitz gives no space for intelligence gathering, deceiving the enemy, etc. Clausewitz is only speaking of ‘bloody decisive battle.’ Several limitations in Clausewitz’s theory of warfare which Gat cites becomes clear if one compares On War with other military theorists from different cultural traditions like Sun Tzu from ancient Confucian China and Kautilya from ancient Hindu India. While Kautilya's Arthashastra (300 BCE) details that politics is king and war is its servant, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (500 BCE) gives a lot of space to spies, misinformation and disinformation campaigns which are to be conducted to weaken the enemy before, during and after the battle.

Gat notes that the contradictions present in On War allowed the interpreters of Clausewitz to present the book according to their own liking, which ironically has added to Clausewitz’s fame as a profound philosopher of war. While late nineteenth and early twentieth century German interpreters stressed on Clausewitz’s emphasis on bloody battles as being the true nature of war, the American and British commentators during the Cold War highlighted Clausewitz’s concept of limited war which Gat scathingly calls the ‘vegetarian Clausewitz.’ Gat ends his volume by saying that Clausewitz cannot reconcile his uncertainty whether there can be a universal theory of war or wars are characterized by historical particularities. Nor can Clausewitz reasonably explain why defence is the stronger form of war.

Credit is due to Gat for pushing the argument that in order to understand Clausewitz’s On War, one needs to look beyond the book and seriously scrutinise the other related writings of Clausewitz. Gat bases his argument about the inherent confusion in the mind of the Prussian military theorist by tracing the paper trail which Clausewitz had left behind in order to understand the evolving trajectory of his theorization of war. However, disentangling intellectual history on the basis of paper trail is murky. Development of intellectual ideas frequently does not leave behind documentary evidence. Further, Gat in his persuasive way argues that Clausewitz was not using Hegelian dialectics. Hegelian dialectics would explain the author moving to and fro throughout On War between the advantages of offence versus defence or between limited and absolute war. Just because there is no recorded evidence does not mean that Clausewitz was not deeply influenced by Hegelian dialectics. Much of the confusion in On War which Gat points out can be solved if we accept that Vom Kriege is a polysemic work (there are several layers of meaning within it). From the other side, Gat can be accused of evaluating On War by using an empiricist-positivist rather than reflexive analytical framework.

To conclude, as expected from a historian of Gat’s standing, his present book forcefully urges us to revisit the stature of Clausewitz. Probably On War is depicting the nature of ‘Western Way of War’ rather than providing a universal theory of war. The Clausewitz Myth is an informative and enjoyable read for both scholars and the educated public. In the end, Gat’s slim volume has added another layer of enigma to the already enigmatic figure.

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Our Reviewer: Dr. Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor, Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is the author of numerous works in military history, such as Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941–1942, The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857 - 1947, The Indian Army in the Two World Wars, Sepoys against the Rising Sun: The Indian Army in Far East and South-East Asia, 1941–45, and many more. He previously reviewed Civil War Infantry Tactics.

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Note: The Clausewitz Myth is also available in e-editions.

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