A Deep Look at Infantry Combat during the Civil War

Strategy is the focus of most of the modern military historians. Their driving assumption is that strategy is the ‘dog’ and tactics is the ‘tail.’ In other words, strategy shapes the course and consequences of the battles and campaigns. So, for cutting edge military studies, tactics is treated as the step child. Those military historians who practice the ‘history from below’ approach, highlight the somatosensory experiences of the combatants rather than the techniques and procedures of combat at the forward edge of the battle area. We forget that a country following a good strategy might be let down in the battlefield by inadequate tactics of its military forces. Similarly, a country with a faulty strategy might continue the struggle for an inordinate amount of time causing a lot of casualties to its opponents. One example is Nazi Germany during W.W. II.

In the volume under review, noted historian of the American Civil War (1861-1865), Earl J. Hess, turns the spotlight on the theory and practice of combat tactics in the battlefields. Based on a plethora of archival sources, Hess forcefully challenges the technological determinist view that introduction of rifles shaped the tactics of infantry combat. The dominant opinion is that the longer range of rifles (500 yards) compared to the shorter ranged smoothbore muskets (100 yards) shaped the contours of techniques of infantry combat. Instead of close order linear tactics, the soldiers got dispersed and the result was a comparatively ‘empty’ battlefield.

Despite the rifles’ longer range, Hess shows with countless examples, the infantry operated in ‘shoulder to shoulder’ formation and liked to get engaged in close quarter combat due to their assumption (which actually proved right) that firepower of their handheld weapon was more effective at closer range. In fact, due to the presence of field fortifications, longer range firing at the enemy was not that effective. Hess continues that even during the battles of the American Civil War, linear and column formations remained the most effective tactical organizations. Most of the Civil War firefights occurred at one hundred yards range. Further, despite having the muzzle loading rifle, the average infantryman did not fire two volleys in one minute. Rather, the average rate was one volley in every one or two minutes as in the case of smoothbore musket.

The battlefield extended with the introduction of field artillery from the 1880s. Even then, as Hess points out, among infantry possessing modern handheld weapons with longer range and higher firing rate, close quarter combat remains the order of the day. This was due to the development of field fortifications.

Next Hess shows that the theory and praxis of tactics for both the Confederate and the Union armies were indeed shaped by the contemporary European tactical thought. This does not mean that the American military theorists slavishly imitated the European tactical formulas. Rather, taking into account the local conditions, both the American military theorists and the field officers adopted and adapted the European military tactical heritage as per their requirements. For instance, instead of the traditional three lines of infantry which was common in the European battlefields, the commanders of the Confederate and Union forces generally deployed their troops in two lines. Then again, assault of the enemy infantry formations by column was less common in American Civil War battles in contrast to the Napoleonic battles. The American commanders liked to march in column and deploy in line for battles. Napoleon’s signature tactics which involved use of ordre mixte was not popular among the American commanders. Instead of mixing line and column alternately within the same formation of troops, American officers organized support units in columns within a multiple line formation. Despite changes and continuity with Napoleonic Wars, the basic paradigm of linear tactics more or less held sway over the Civil War battlefields.

Hess’ volume shows that with conscript and volunteer soldiers, the implementation of effective tactics required intensive training (mainly drilling) and forceful leadership at the lower levels of command. Not only did the American officers pay attention to it but they also learnt from the past campaigns. With the passage of time, the tactical manuals were continuously updated. Further, towards the end of the American Civil War, officers and theorists started tinkering with small unit tactics involving squads and sections. As they gained experience in battle, the commanders used more and more skirmishers and the flexible linear system was reorganized for implementing a looser formation in the battlefield. Hess concludes that the Civil War commanders were adept in tactical maneuvers of the battalions and brigades but failed at the division and corps levels of command. Shortcomings at these two levels prevented the American commanders from following up victory by sending fresh reserve formations to exploit the retreat of the hostile army. This shortcoming on the part of the senior American officers resulted in the absence of breakthrough-breakout-pursuit and complete destruction of the enemy forces that could have resulted in the quick end of war. One must note that corps level command remained a failing of the British Army even during the initial period of the First World War.

To sum up, Hess’ Civil War Infantry Tactics is an insightful, readable book. One gets a clear idea about how the American Civil War armies of both the Confederacy and the Union marched to the battlefield and engaged in a firefight. The tactical analysis at the battalion level (Civil War armies mainly used one battalion regiments) is excellent. My only regret is that infantry tactics during sieges is not covered, probably due to lack of space. Hopefully, this pathbreaking study will encourage military historians to turn the limelight on the hitherto neglected field of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

---//---

Our Reviewer: Dr. Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor, Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is the author of numerous works in military history, such as Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941–1942, The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857 - 1947, The Indian Army in the Two World Wars, Sepoys against the Rising Sun: The Indian Army in Far East and South-East Asia, 1941–45, and many more.

---///---

Note: Civil War Infantry Tactics is also available in e-editions.

StrategyPage reviews are published in cooperation with The New York Military Affairs Symposium

www.nymas.org