As canny military book marketers are well aware, there is intense Western interest in the ever-expanding Chinese navy, with its shiny new ships aggressively plowing seas near and far. China's maritime force is indisputably the world's largest, surpassing the USN in terms of vessels (if not in overall tonnage and battle missiles).

Given all this, copywriters cleverly slapped the cover title "China's New Navy" in gigantic type on Professor Xiaobing Li's latest book, which is intended to guarantee maximum attention from the target audience.

Hmmm??? This is unwarranted attention, in my opinion, especially if the reader expects an evaluation of the current Chinese fleet and its capabilities. The volume's subtitle (in much, much smaller type) reads: "The Evolution of PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy] from the People's Revolution to a 21st Century Cold War." This description better represents the professor's work. More accurately, he describes his own book simply as a "historical overview."

In his rather superficial, seven-page conclusion ("Xi's New Navy"), Li whizzes through the period from Xi's assumption of power (2012) to about 2021, lightly touching on familiar events like the growth of the carrier arm, increased exercises with Russia, and the greater emphasis on "grey zone" near-warfare, with little attempt at detail or analysis. China's New Navy would be more valuable if this section had been expanded. (Admittedly, the furious pace of new ships sliding down the Chinese quays makes it challenging to stay ahead: 30 warships were added between 2022 and 2023.)

Of course, the author can't be faulted for not writing what the publisher advertises. And I do not deny that the professor's history lesson has plenty of merit. Professor Li scans “More than 1,200 Chinese naval operations from 1949-2009. Examples are the joint landing campaigns in the Taiwan Strait Crises, battles in the South China Sea, air defense against American pilots during Operation Rolling Thunder, and anti-piracy training rotations in Africa".

The author is quite thorough, presenting many sources of information. He has painstakingly interviewed a flock of relevant personnel, both retired and active. Li's slim 197-page volume essentially reviews the long period before the Chinese fleet became a credible threat to the USN.

However, the present menace of Xi's PLAN -- at least to an American reader -- is far more interesting than the ups and downs of its development and earlier experiences. I am not convinced that the story of the Chinese Navy's decades-long metamorphosis can reveal all that much about its present tactics, capabilities, and problems.

Before Xi : Foreign readers likely presume that Xi Jinping (now chairman-for-as-long-as-he-wants) is alone responsible for what appears -- from the outside -- to be a rather sudden naval expansion. But he was not the kickstarter. According to the author, it took the scrawny Chinese navy years and years to become the biggest maritime armada on the planet.

He informs the reader about the slow but determined persuasion of earlier Chinese naval visionaries, who had fought an uphill battle against the generals running the military, not to mention party leaders. After all, China had long been a land power. These prophets dreamed of a future when the PLAN functioned as much more than a brown-water --i.e., riverine and coastal -- appendage of the Army. China's export/import explosion overseas during the last three decades clinched their arguments, however.

In the final few chapters, Li goes back into the 1980s and 1990s to identify those pioneers who argued for a "blue-water" (or oceanic) navy. Such a fleet would not only dominate the nation's near waters, but it would be able to function and fight outside China's confined seas.

Chief among them was Admiral Liu Huaqing, who took over PLAN leadership in the early 1980s. By then, his command had evolved into a sizeable force; it boasted several new types of warships, and it appeared capable of dominance over regional rivals inside the "first island chain." In other words, PLAN had become a "green water" fleet, one whose firepower could be quickly bolstered by nearby air and missile forces on its coast.

Liu maintained influence in the highest government reaches, continuously advocating for a powerful maritime presence. After President Deng's retirement, Jiang Zemin [1990-2002] became China's leader and vigorously supported "Admiral Liu Huaqing's perception of China's sea power, maritime interests, and oceanic sovereignty." Professor Li declares that "the Chinese navy evolved and became one of the world naval powers from 1990 to 2012." At that point, Xi Jinping assumed the helm of the state and bolstered an already intense building program.

Summing Up: At last count, China's fleet numbers 370 warships, including two small operating carriers (and a floating full-sized version engaged in sea trials). A fourth appears to be on the way. (This total does not include a heavily militarized Coast Guard, nor does it tally the many small "commercial" vessels that conveniently operate at Beijing's bidding.) The USN can deploy 293, but our few surviving shipyards can only construct new ones slowly. Of course, the United States can call upon competent naval allies in the region; China may only have North Korea and Russia to rely on . . . maybe.

The author writes clearly, and his book is well-organized and quite informative. It presents extensive notes (mostly translated into English) and an impressive bibliography. Nevertheless, there are no maps, charts, tables, or illustrations. Professor Li tends to be light on analysis and carefully maintains a neutral stance. As I said, he stopped too soon for my taste.

However, The writer points out a disturbing concern about the future in his final paragraph. He believes there has been a gradual shift in PLA/PLAN doctrine from a long-standing "Don't Fire First" maxim to a now-acceptable idea: "Firing first is a justifiable defense."

Good to know. Are you listening, Seventh Fleet C-in-C?

Note: China’s New Navy is also available in e-editions. 

StrategyPage reviews are published in cooperation with The New York Military Affairs Symposium

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