The Might Eighth

The US Eighth Air Force has been the subject of much writing, starting with its improvised creation in early 1942. None of the three other numbered US air forces in the European Theatre of Operations during the Second World War have attracted anywhere near its coverage. When Kenneth Werrell’s bibliography of writing about the Eighth Air Force was published in 1996, it ran over 500 pages, and there has certainly been extensive growth since then. The Eighth’s history – especially in 1942-43 – was more dramatic than just about any other episode of American airpower, reflected in stage and movie dramas such as Twelve O’clock High and Command Decision and William Wyler’s classic documentary The Memphis Belle. Recently, Masters of the Air brought the story to a new generation, streaming on television.

This is not an operational history of the bomber offensive over Europe or US strategic bombing, or of the technologies and aircraft that, for better or worse, made it possible. The evolution of US daylight bombing, and the aircraft associated with it is largely outside the scope here, although the author does refer to a “bomber mafia” without identifying how it shaped the Eighth or which of the people he is writing about were members. This book differentiates itself from the previous literature through its focus on one key issue from 1942-43: the relationship between Ira Eaker, who commanded first the Eighth Bomber Command and then the Eighth Air Force through its first 17 months of combat, and General Henry “Hap” Arnold, the Army Air Force chief of staff. The third participant in this relationship was Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, who preceded Eaker in command of the Eighth. This is a book about command relationships, focused on that between Arnold and Eaker but also involving high-level Anglo-American leadership. The supporting cast of this drama includes Churchill, at the four-star level, Marshall and Eisenhower, and many, many others, some that deserve book-length treatments.

The book draws primarily from the extensive published literature on the strategic war over Europe and especially the Eighth Air Force, including the published biographies of his major characters, and has been supplemented by material from archival sources. Arnold, Eaker and Spaatz all have been the subjects of worthwhile biographies and have left valuable and accessible papers.

None of these generals were strangers to each other. Arnold and Eaker were old friends and had been co-authors of a series of young adult novels on aviation topics in the interwar years. Arnold also built high-level relationships in Washington; he was one of the few invited to address General Marshall by his first name, something President Roosevelt reportedly tried to do only once before encountering a disapproving stare.

Arnold and Eaker were both devoted to the establishment of an independent US Air Force. Eaker, though starting his career as a fighter pilot, believed that unescorted formations of US four-engine bombers were not only unstoppable, but would destroy German industry through precision daylight bombing while defeating the Luftwaffe fighter force through massed defensive firepower.

Eaker’s vision of victory through airpower in Europe collided with hard reality. How this was reported to Arnold and how Raker reacted to Arnold’s demands for victory is the central theme of this book. In 1942-43, Eaker kept sending Arnold reports of massive victory claims that were ten to twenty times the number of aircraft that the Germans lost (and would report in messages decrypted by ULTRA). U-boat pens proved impervious to the largest bombs US bombers could carry. This was not allowed to interfere with the missions against them.

The relationship between Arnold and Eaker became dominated by Arnold’s insistence on Eaker’s reporting increasing metrics, in terms of effort expended in the absence of evidence of results. Arnold needed victories. Eaker, throughout his command, explained that Clausewitz’s friction is not limited to ground combat and operational headwinds that together buffeted the Eighth included weather, deficiencies in training, time to modify or repair aircraft and much more. That airpower is about coalition war-fighting – something that Eaker recognized – has to be reconciled with the expectations of the US national command authority (and the people that vote for them and pay the taxes). Eaker sent back realities. None of this made an impression on Arnold. He wanted American results he could show on a single sheet of paper.

The enemy always has a vote on how things work out. Under Eaker’s command, the Eighth was defeated in its daylight bombing campaigns, unescorted by fighters beyond the German border, in 1943. The Eighth achieved some powerful successes, but the impact of these was often not recognized at the time; the emphasis on bombing had forced the Eighth to improvise its intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, building on British experience. The two raids on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt – both the subjects of much writing – each saw the loss of 60 bombers and uncertain long-term results. It was months before the Eighth returned to a high-tempo offensive over Germany, enabled by the creation of a US fighter escort capability. In March 1944, for the first time, US single engine fighters flew over Berlin. Hermann Goering, watching them fly in formation over his headquarters, finally realized Germany’s ultimate defeat was now just a matter of time. The story of the Eighth remains a familiar example of innovation and adaptation under wartime conditions. Even Eaker, who did not consider fighter escort necessary, did his best to make sure that the Eighth was in position to start to take advantage of long-range fighter capability when it started to emerge.

The book’s story ends before the decisive daylight battles over Germany started in February 1944, with Eaker being relieved of command of the Eighth Air Force and replaced by Jimmy Doolittle, who was able to overcome Arnold’s attempts to remotely manage the Eighth from Washington and institutionalized the close personal relationship Eaker had built with the RAF. Eaker was bitterly disappointed at being removed, but his promotion to three stars as Mediterranean Theater of Operations air commander – with two US numbered air forces and equivalent RAF forces – was hardly a downgrade. Arnold kept to his management approach in Washington despite failing health.

The book’s few sketch maps are barely adequate to show targets on the Continent. The familiar radius maps showing how far the Eighth penetrated at different dates – until it finally arrived over Berlin in March 1944 -- and the extension escort fighter coverage by date – they also went to Berlin in March -- would have been a plus.

While the editing of this book avoided typos and language errors, there are irritating historical mistakes that should have fallen victim to editors’ red pens (for example, on p. 13, the US Navy’s prewar support for the Norden bombsight and their eagerness to put them on their PBY Catalinas gets missed). While acronyms are inevitable in books on military aviation, historical or current, the author is too eager to insert those of his own devising (“BA” for the British Army).

The human dimension of high-level command, often only appears in print filtered through the passage of time and memory. But the personalities and motivations of Arnold, Eaker and Spaatz -- the men behind the command relationships documented in the published sources and archived communications -- remain almost entirely elusive here. It would have been worthwhile to look at how these links were built and maintained.

The author points out how Eaker built strong personal relationships with the British. Churchill and senior RAF figures remained unconvinced that daylight bombing of Germany would be sustainable or that single-engine escort fighters could fly to Berlin and back. But they helped ensure his promotion even when forced by Arnold to relinquish command of the Eighth.

The chef at Eighth Air Force headquarters – who had been chef at the Brown Derby in Hollywood pre-war and a gunner on a B-17 in 1942-43 – did an oral history in the 1990s in which he talked about the diplomatic elements of high command, as he was the one preparing first-rate dinners for Churchill and others in heavily rationed Britain. There are a few insights. Spaatz was a devoted poker player; Curtis LeMay said that he received his commander’s intent not from orders but at the card table. Arnold’s insistence on micromanagement and concern over details led him to inflate a life raft inside his office in the Pentagon to demonstrate its inadequacy to a visiting aircraft manufacturer.

The history covered in this book certainly has relevance to today’s realities. The Eighth Air Force -- eight months from stand-up in Savannah, Georgia, to bombs-away over occupied France – stands as a reproach to the multiyear timeframes required to make and implement decisions. The tension between Washington’s expectations for airpower and the realities faced by those putting the missions together – the rock that wrecked the Arnold-Eaker relationship – has remained in place throughout America’s conflicts, most recently in Operation Inherent Resolve in the Middle East. But, in that conflict, no one was shot down.

The US Eighth Air Force in World War II is a worthwhile contribution to the extensive literature on the Eighth Air Force and the combined bomber offensive. By concentrating on one two-way command relationship and aiming to keep it in the context of the operations by the Eighth, this book provides insights that remain valuable.

Note: The US Eighth Air Force in World War II is also available in e-editions.

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